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Abstract
Background: For decades, the food industry has sought to deflect criticisms of its products and block public health 
legislation through a range of offensive and defensive strategies. More recently, food corporations have moved on to 
present themselves as “part of the solution” to the health problems their products cause. This strategic approach is 
characterised by appeasement, co-option and partnership, and involves incremental concessions and attempts to partner 
with health actors. This paper details how corporate practices have evolved and changed over the past two decades and 
gives some definition to what this new political economy signifies for the wider behaviours of corporations producing 
and selling harmful commodities.
Methods: This paper draws on public health and political science literature to classify the food industry’s “part of the 
solution” strategy into three broad components: regulatory responses and capture; relationship building; and market 
strategies. We detail the key characteristics and consequences of each component.
Results: The three components of the food industry’s “part of the solution” strategy all involve elements of appeasement 
and co-option. They also improve the political environment and resources of the food industry. Regulatory responses 
offer incremental concessions that seek to maintain corporate influence over governance processes and minimise the 
threat of regulations; relationship building fosters access to health and government stakeholders, and opportunities to 
acquire and maintain channels of direct influence; and market strategies to make products and portfolios healthier 
bolster the market share and revenue of food corporations while improving their public image. 
Conclusion: Rather being a signal of lost position and power, the food industry’s repositioning as “part of the solution” 
has created a highly profitable political economy of ‘healthy’ food production, alongside continued production of 
unhealthy commodities, a strategy in which it is also less burdensome and conflictual for corporations to exercise 
political power and influence.
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Background
The response and positioning of the food industry to obesity 
and other diet-related diseases has substantially changed since 
the early 2000s. Before this point of transition, the corporate 
strategic response to public health criticisms of their products 
and government attempts to regulate their industries were 
vigorously oppositional. Burgeoning criticism of their products 
and business models, increasingly oppositional government 
and civil society, and attempts to regulate products and 
markets, were all met with countervailing force.1-4 Indeed, the 
food industry had historically deployed a range of offensive 
and defensive political strategies to protect its business 
interests. Public health researchers have analysed these 
strategies, and collectively this body of literature illuminates 
the packaged food and beverage industry’s more overt and 
confrontational efforts to shape the political, regulatory and 
non-market environment in its favour.5-9 These offensive and 
defensive strategies have marked the histories of corporate 
strategies toward potentially hostile regulation of harmful 
products in general and have three broad dimensions. 
The first involves attacking, distorting or undermining 
the considerable bodies of scientific evidence linking 
consumption of particular products to obesity or other diet-
related diseases, for example by funding research that disputes 
the relationship between sugary drinks and obesity.10 The 
literature on the corporate use of science denial has grown, 
and now encompasses many decades of subterfuge by both 
the food and tobacco industries. Funding ‘astroturf ’ groups 
and think tanks (such as the Heritage Foundation) to oppose 
policy and science, and the deployment of ‘fake scientists’ 
and suborned expertise have also been commonly used and 
documented, as for example by the Big Sugar industries.11
A second strategy focused on manipulating the mechanisms 
and agents of policy-making, using political donations, special 
interest pleading for the benefits of associated agriculture 
for farmers groups and so on, or by using political influence 
to block or undermine public health policies perceived as 
threatening to business interests, as has been the case with 
the stymieing the development of robust nutrition policies in 
national and multilateral contexts.5 Campaign donations to 
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influence voting, exercising influence through the revolving 
door, were routine and still very much continue even after the 
ostensible shift in corporate strategy toward public health that 
we detail.12 The criticism of public health policies and use of 
litigation to oppose unwanted policies have also been used 
been offensively and defensively to measures that would affect 
market positions or sale of harmful products.13,14
A third strategy sought to fragment and discredit industry 
opposition within the public health nutrition community.15,16 
This has included personal threats to researchers and public 
health professionals15,17 as well as monitoring and surveillance 
of them by corporations.18,19 Companies have also used their 
public relations divisions and corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) initiatives to position themselves as public health 
leaders. For example, internal documents from Coca-Cola 
reveal that an explicit aim of its “Movement is Happiness” 
campaign was to “marginalize detractors,” namely those 
in the public health community and government that were 
opposed to its core market strategies and outlook.20 Public 
health advocacy more generally has therefore suffered, and 
been described as perhaps consequentially fragmented and 
often uncoordinated.21,22
Of course, all these strategies are not mutually exclusive and 
have been deployed simultaneously across multiple sectors, 
products, institutions and scientific and regulatory domains. 
We note that is a multi-level and multi-nodal governance 
strategic ‘game’ that corporations have become adept at 
playing across different governance settings and spheres of 
public life, using techniques such as forum shifting to pursue 
gains.23 However, we argue that something has changed, and 
it is clear that the business and non-market strategies of food 
corporations have reconfigured themselves over the last two 
decades in terms of the use of different levers and strategies 
that are now employed to achieve the regulatory and non-
market political and regulatory conditions. These political 
and regulatory conditions – the non-market environment - 
form an essential counterpart to their market strategies and 
profits. Indeed, since 2000 even the defensive and oppositional 
strategies described above have become more nuanced in 
parallel with the approaches described in this paper. Food 
corporations now additionally pursue what can be framed as 
a “part of the solution” strategy, characterised by appeasement 
and co-option (in contrast to the overt opposition which 
characterised their early strategies). In this paper we seek to 
outline how the strategic game had shifted and why. What is 
immediately clear is that food corporations have recognised 
that scientific evidence of the health harms being caused by 
their products, such as ultra-processed, sugar sweetened, 
high-salt content and trans-fat laden foods, was simply too 
overwhelming to counter simply by continuing to rely upon 
strategies of opposition, doubt and denial. Growing public 
awareness of the health harms associated with consumption 
of ultra-processed foods presented a business risk for the 
food industry (for example as evidenced in reduced sales 
of sugary drinks in the Global North) as well as a potential 
loss of credibility, as public health campaigns and media 
attention exposed the food industry’s political strategies.24-26 
Furthermore, by the early 2000s, governments and 
multilateral bodies were finally acting against their products 
and business strategies by means of legislation, or by real or 
threatened hostile regulatory environments. In response, food 
corporations have moved on to present industry as being a 
necessary “part of the solution” to the health problems their 
products cause. 
The spectrum of industry strategies that fall under what can 
be loosely termed the “part of the solution” umbrella is broad, 
and available analyses differs in terms of what are included 
or excluded from typologies of this strategic approach.5,16,27,28 
Among the strategies of co-option and appeasement in the 
food domain we would point to the importance of product 
reformulation, nutrition labelling, restricting marketing 
to children, nutrition education, the removal of unhealthy 
products from schools and promotion of physical activity. 
These are both important marketing strategies and non-
market strategies that give legitimacy to the firms involved, 
creating, again, a perception of good health citizenship. 
Added to this, corporations are more engaged in public-
private partnerships and the levers that ensure that regulation 
stops at self-regulation. As was the case with the offensive and 
defensive strategic outlook, these areas of strategy are pursued 
as a simultaneous, multi-level, multi-nodal manner, requiring 
engagement with other actors over a range of institutions, 
products and sectors. 
It is significant that the “part of the solution” strategy first 
emerged in the early 2000s, heralded by public pledges from 
leading food companies about how they would help address 
obesity. In early 2003, Kraft Foods publicly acknowledged 
the role of the food industry in the obesity ‘issue,’ and later 
that year Coca-Cola released its first “Model Guidelines for 
School Beverage Partnerships.”29,30 Beneath these ‘Road to 
Damascus changes’ several market and political dynamics 
actually compelled the food industry to shift strategy. Of these 
dynamics, the changing logics of corporate risk and threatened 
market positions loom large. For example, concerns from 
business investors about the risks obesity presented for 
some food companies have been identified31,32; as well as 
a growing body of research about the contribution of the 
food environment to diet-related diseases.33-36 Furthermore, 
campaigns from civil society and public health organisations 
targeting the food industry were gaining traction.5 Notably, 
alongside these shifts in the calculations of risk, causation and 
accountability, we see the emergence of government policies 
regulating the food industry, and in particular soft drinks.37
But industry is agile and thinks ahead (hence strategy), 
while learning the lessons of past mistakes by other sectors. 
The food industry learned from the tobacco industry. The 
timing of the strategic shift with food corporations follows 
a significant transition in public, political and regulatory 
orientations regarding another harmful product sector, where 
corporations had by then over-played their hand in terms of 
the strategies of opposition and hostility described above. By 
the late 1990s, tobacco companies became concerned about 
their loss of access to political elites and the dangers of hostile 
regulatory environments and loss of regulatory chill, as 
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epitomised in the development of the Framework Convention 
on Tobacco Control. Big Tobacco then began a CSR campaign 
to win back access to policy-makers and improve their public 
image,38 a strategy that continues today. Reflecting on the 
tobacco industry’s previous strategy of denial and hostility, 
a former Vice President of Kraft (which was part of tobacco 
company Philip Morris for two decades) argued that the 
tobacco industry would have been better off reforming their 
marketing and sacrificing some profits in order to “disarm 
their critics.”39 In light of the tobacco industry’s experience, 
we can observe that a key aim of the food industry’s “part of 
the solution” strategy has been to maintain political legitimacy 
by means of appeasement and engagement. It is also notable 
that many of the front foundations and scientists employed by 
tobacco in their denial and doubt campaigns migrated to food 
sectors, bringing further knowledge of necessary adjustments 
to the new political environment with them.40
This paper seeks to show how this “part of the solution” 
strategy has emerged and diffused through the food industry 
in the context of growing market and regulatory threats to 
the industry. We note from the outset that more offensive 
and oppositional strategies are still part of food industry non-
market strategies, especially when core market positions are 
under threat, or when regulatory, legal or food governance 
arrangements are perceived as weak or easy to dominate, as is 
often the case in some low-and middle-income countries and 
the United States.41,42 While corporations will therefore also 
continue to sell harmful products where and if they can, they 
have also switched market strategies to diversify products 
while developing non-market strategies to accommodate and 
co-opt healthy eating agendas and public health advances. 
New, more agile market strategies and forms of relationship 
building with regulators and stakeholders have been advanced. 
We seek to detail how the food industry’s “part of the solution” 
strategy is characterised by agility and responsiveness, as seen 
through three key pillars of this strategy: regulatory responses 
and capture; relationship building; and new market strategies. 
These three strategic pillars also help reveal and delineate the 
strategic value of appeasement and co-option (as opposed to 
overt opposition), and we give some definition to what this 
new political economy signifies for the wider behaviours of 
corporations producing and selling harmful commodities. We 
argue that rather being a signal of lost position and power, the 
development of a new strategic platform has actually created 
new business opportunities emerging from new products and 
markets. Of course, it has also acted to salvage an otherwise 
potentially catastrophic regulatory environment. Instead, the 
change of strategy has created an environment less hostile 
to business interests than appeared to be emerging at the 
turn of the millennium, arguably fostering a transformed 
political and regulatory environment in which it has become 
less burdensome and conflictual for corporations to exercise 
political power and influence.
Methods
This paper offers a theoretical and critical public health 
discussion of the food industry’s strategy to present itself as 
‘part of the solution’ to obesity. It draws on political science 
and food policy scholarship, in particular the concepts of 
hegemony and corporate power, to interpret the shift in food 
corporation strategies from overt opposition and conflict to 
appeasement and compromise. Key elements of hegemony 
relevant to our analysis are grounded in Gramscian notions 
that “coalitions and compromises that provide a measure of 
political and material accommodation” in order to preserve 
the existing status quo, and that power is amplified and 
legitimised when it is garnered by what are perceived as being 
socially consensual means.43,44 Furthermore, food policy 
scholarship has similarly argued that powerful corporations 
“appropriate social movement demands to serve renewed 
accumulation,” thus bringing in Gramscian understandings 
of co-option as a tool of hegemonic power.45 It is through 
these lenses of accommodation, consensus and co-option in 
the pursuit of profits and power that we interpret the food 
industry’s strategy to position itself as part of the solution. 
We will show that while many corporate initiatives in these 
directions, at face value, show the food industry’s willingness 
to make incremental changes to align with public health 
demands, they also serve to reinforce the industry’s economic 
and political power, and do so with a semblance of perceived 
legitimacy and notwithstanding the market strategies and 
health harms they continue to perpetuate. 
We have selected three facets of the food industry’s ‘part of 
the solution’ strategy to demonstrate how accommodation 
and co-option manifest across different market and political 
activities of the global food industry: regulatory responses, 
relationship building and market strategies. The first strategy 
concerning regulatory responses is an example of how food 
companies and trade associations have sought to capture, co-
opt and diminish regulatory processes through the use and 
promotion of industry self-regulation. The second strategic 
response, relationship building, demonstrates how the food 
industry has strategically cultivated partnerships with credible 
stakeholders in an effort to bolster their legitimacy through 
co-option and consensus building. The third, new market 
strategies, reveals how food companies have changed their 
product portfolios to more closely align with public health 
recommendations, whilst disarming criticism and making 
profit.
For each case, we outline the characteristics of each 
component and provide illustrative examples of how some of 
the largest global food companies and trade associations have 
implemented these strategies over the past two decades. These 
examples are drawn from the published literature and from 
primary research conducted by the authors. The examples 
are not intended to be comprehensive, but rather illustrate 
the breadth and diversity of activities that the largest food 
industry actors have engaged in. Where possible, examples 
are provided for a range of countries in the global North and 
South, as well as national and global initiatives. 
We conclude with a discussion of the broad contours of the 
food corporate strategic culture of accommodation that as 
emerged in the last two decades and how it differs from and 
supports its strategy of opposition. Our discussion explores 
what these dynamics signal for the political economy of food 
markets and their governance.
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Results
Regulatory Responses
Corporate self-regulation is a key component of the food 
industry’s strategy to position itself as “part of the solution” 
to obesity and other diet-related health issues. Self-regulation 
refers to the voluntary pledges, commitments, standards, codes 
of practice or other rule-setting initiatives that companies or 
industries have created and pledged to follow.46-48 The scope 
of self-regulation varies considerably between companies, 
countries and issues (see Table 1).
What is not immediately apparent from this table is that 
self-regulation initiatives are not static initiatives, but “living 
documents” and programs that change over time in response 
to changes in their political and market environments.48 Since 
the early 2000s, self-regulation has gradually transformed 
from relatively weak and uncoordinated corporate pledges 
to a coordinated sector-wide set of commitments and actions 
that respond to specific public health policy proposals. 
For example, Kraft’s 2003 pledge referred to improving 
existing products and capping the portion size of single 
serve packages, yet it did not provide details about what this 
would entail or any timeframes for achieving the pledge.29 
In contrast, the company’s 2021 pledges provide specific 
nutrient reduction targets and timeframes in line with their 
‘Global Nutrition Guidelines.’52 Situating the food industry’s 
gradual strengthening of its pledges and actions within an 
increasingly hostile regulatory landscape helps to understand 
some of the political benefits of adapting and improving self-
regulation.
On the one hand, this transformation reflects the growing 
regulatory threats that the food industry faces, as governments 
develop a range of initiatives to reduce consumption of 
unhealthy foods and beverages.37 Rather than passively accept 
these policies, food companies have used and are using 
self-regulation to proactively pre-empt policy development 
and hostile regulatory environments. For example the 
International Food and Beverage Alliance launched its global 
pledge during the 2008 World Health Assembly where world 
leaders were planning to discuss the issue of marketing to 
children; and soft drink companies have launched sugar 
reduction pledges when governments begin to consider taxes 
or labelling polices.53-55 
The ability to modify and re-launch an industry pledge/s 
helps the strategy of self-regulation to accommodate and pacify 
public health pressure for regulatory or legislative action. For 
example, the Australian Beverages Council sought to pre-
empt a proposed legislated tax on sugary drinks by launching 
a reformulation pledge.56 In contrast, the failure to adapt and 
improve self-regulation may contribute to an otherwise more 
enabling environment for government regulation. While the 
food industry rolled out front-of-pack labelling schemes in 
the mid-2000s, these have remained relatively unchanged 
since their inception (for example soft drink industry calorie/
energy labelling, or variations on the Daily Intake Guide for 
the packaged food industry).57 As governments become more 
proactive in developing policies to improve food environments 
in their countries, this food industry inertia may have also 
contributed to the success of stricter labelling schemes, such 
as with the multiple traffic light in the United Kingdom, 
Ecuador and Bolivia and the black stop sign in Chile.58-60 In 
contrast, the absence of mandatory reformulation targets 
in most countries suggests that the food industry’s more 
dynamic reformulation initiatives helped to diffuse pressure 
for regulation.21,61 In positioning self-regulation as a policy 
alternative, the food industry performs a balancing act. The 
industry pledge must demonstrate enough progress to meet 
some (but not all) of the demands from public health. This 
allows them to progressively incorporate additional demands 
from public health and launch modified pledge with the 
attendant benefits of public relations, policy pre-emption and 
chill (for example, Pepsi has launched several versions of its 
global commitment to reduce sugar in its products).62,63
Analysis of industry forestry certification standards also 
describes a similar “ratcheting up” of industry standards 
and suggests that concessions and accommodations are used 
to acquire and secure corporate rule-making power.64 The 
willingness of the food industry to continually adapt and 
change its self-regulation initiatives suggests that the key issue 
for the industry is not the debate over what goes into nutrition 
policies, but rather the debate over who governs nutrition 
Table 1. Examples of Food Industry Self-regulation Initiatives
Stakeholder Year Location Focus
Kraft Food 2003 United States School marketing, portion size, product nutrition
Coca-Cola 2003 United States Beverage availability in school vending machines
Kraft Food 2004 United States Front of pack labelling, general health promotion
American Beverage Association 2005 United States Beverage availability in school vending machines
International Council of Beverages Associations 2008 Global Marketing to children
International Food and Beverage Alliance 2008 Global Reformulation, marketing to children, labelling, education, public-private-partnerships
Australian Food and Grocery Council 2009 Australia Marketing to children
Nestlé 2014 Global Front-of-pack labelling
PepsiCo 2016 Global Sugar reduction/reformulation 
Australian Beverages Council 2018 Australia Sugar reduction/reformulation
Unilever nd Thailand Salt reduction/reformulation
Information sourced from:21,29,48-51
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policies. The development of self-regulation also represents 
the food industry’s attempt to create nutrition policy on its 
own terms and to demonstrate its capacity to participate, 
consensually and collaboratively, in policy development (a 
theme we elaborate on in the following section). 
Relationship Building 
A second facet of the co-option and appeasement strategy 
is fostering or improving relationships with health and 
government stakeholders. The food industry pursues 
relationship building in a multitude of ways that go far 
beyond the traditional lobbying that occurs in the corridors 
of government. These relationships (and relationship 
building activities) differ in terms of their formality and 
institutionalisation, ranging from research contracts and 
formal advisory groups to more ad hoc and opportunistic 
activities, such as inviting politicians to attend board meetings. 
Table 2 documents a range of strategies that the food industry 
has used to initiate, maintain or improve relationships between 
the food industry and health and government stakeholders.
Some strategies focus more on building relationships with 
health professionals and researchers than on policy-makers or 
institutions, for example recruiting public health and nutrition 
professionals to serve as advisors or to conduct research 
for the industry.3,5 Relationships with health and nutrition 
professionals provide professional expertise and can serve as 
liaisons between industry and health communities, providing 
similar to the benefits of the revolving door with government 
agencies.3,5,12 The food industry has also participated in 
the evaluation of their self-regulation, providing data and 
information to researchers. For example, organisations that 
monitor corporate health promotion initiatives (such as 
the Access to Nutrition Index, INFORMAS (International 
Network for Food and Obesity/non-communicable diseases 
Research, Monitoring and Action Support) and the George 
Institute) often solicit information and data directly from the 
packaged food and beverage industry.70-73 These relationships 
foster the perception that the industry is cooperative and 
willing to facilitate monitoring of its own initiatives.
The food industry also seeks to gain access to policy-makers 
and the policy-making process, for example participating 
in government inquiries, writing submissions to policies, 
sitting on policy committees or (increasingly) working in 
partnership with governments through public-private-
partnership platforms.74,75 The food industry has leveraged 
its other coalition building strategies to gain access to policy-
makers and the policy-making process. For example, the 
public-private initiative Scaling Up Nutrition has enabled 
a large number of powerful companies to participate in the 
World Health Organization (WHO) policy deliberations and 
decision making.76 The development of self-regulation can be 
used as an opportunity to reach out to health organisations or 
government stakeholders for feedback on its development.53,77 
Multiple political access points are especially important for 
industries that face exclusion from policy-making, such as 
was the case with the tobacco industry.38 As the soft drink 
industry faces growing scrutiny over its relationships with 
nutrition researchers and policy-makers, it may use corporate 
health promotion to broaden its connections with other 
stakeholders and expand its network of indirect political 
connections.3,78-80 
In addition to growing its political allies and connections, 
appeasement and partnership strategies can be used together 
to garner praise from vocal industry critics as well. The 
legitimising function of co-opting erstwhile critics is clearly 
important. A striking example of this was the US Center for 
Science in the Public Interest’s praise for the confectionary 
company Mars when it announced its support for added 
sugar labelling.81 The Center for Science in the Public Interest 
is an outspoken industry critic that has sued the American 
soft drink industry for deceptive marketing.82 The potential 
for the appeasement strategies to foster approval from 
industry critics or generate allies for the industry therefore 
differentiates it from more oppositional political strategies. 
Table 2. Relationship Building Activities
Industry Stakeholder Activity Public Health/Government Stakeholder Year
Australian Beverages 
Council
Government stakeholders invited speakers at Victorian 
Beverage Council Annual General Meeting
Australian Parliamentary Secretary to the Health 
Minister 2001
International Life Sciences 
Institute
Sponsor conferences, working groups and programs in 
China that promoted physical activity over nutrition (Chinese) researchers; health officials; clinicians 
2004-
2015
Coca-Cola, PepsiCo and 
Cadbury-Schweppes
Develop the Alliance for a Healthier Generation to reduce 
the availability of sugary drinks in American schools American Heart Association; Clinton Foundation 2006
Coca-Cola, PepsiCo Sponsor 95 national health organisations in the United States
Centres for Disease Control, National Institute of 






Government stakeholders invited to attend Australian 
Beverages Council annual board meeting
Independent Senator for South Australia; 
Parliamentary Secretary to the Prime Minister; CEO 
of Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry; 
CEO of FSANZ, Deputy CEO of AFGC
2014
Nestlé Collaborate with South African government to provide educational resources about “healthy eating” Department of Basic Education (South Africa) 2018
Abbreviations: CEO, chief executive officer; FSANZ, Food Standards Australia New Zealand; AFGC, Australian Food and Grocery Council.
Information sourced from:30,65-69
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The possibility that antagonistic political strategies will 
damage the public reputation of a company is why we often 
see the food industry’s front groups be the agents that take 
a more oppositional stance, while the company presents 
a conciliatory position.83 Furthermore, the absence of 
oppositional strategies from CSR reporting and the industry’s 
general unwillingness to provide transparency around these 
strategies indicate that corporations recognise the public 
backlash these strategies can bring.84
While the proliferation of public-private partnerships is 
in part an indicator of the success of this strategy, this needs 
to be set in the context of a blurring between public and 
private forms of governance and the rise of public-private-
partnerships as an increasingly common and acceptable form 
of governance.85-88 These forms of public-private governance 
be seen both at the national level (for example the Healthy 
Eating Partnership in Australia and the Public Health 
Responsibility Deal in the United Kingdom) as well as in 
international fora (for example the “Scaling Up Nutrition 
Movement,” the Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition).86,89-91 
The process is two way. Public-private modes of governance 
in health socialise governments, health experts and advocates 
to business practices and interests, with the possibility that 
governance at least recognises or even promotes market 
interests; while at the same time it brings business in to 
governance rather than being purely its subject. Overall, 
this is part of the public-private thrust of health governance 
around the turn of the millennium, it becomes more business 
-like and more business friendly, with business at the table 
and part of the solution across a range of spheres of global 
health – from access to medicines through to nutrition and 
obesity prevention.92
Market Strategies
A third facet of the “part of the solution” strategy has been 
to improve products and product portfolios in terms of their 
health harming composition or production methods. This 
includes portfolio diversification as well as reformulation of 
products to improve their nutrient composition (eg, reducing 
sugar or adding vitamins and minerals).93 Like self-regulation, 
these initiatives differ enormously between products, 
companies, countries and industries. Table 3 documents 
some of the reformulation pledges made by members of the 
International Food and Beverage Alliance as well as “healthy” 
brand acquisitions to diversify the portfolios of processed 
food companies.
This focus on improving product quality is in part a 
reflection of the focus public health campaigns and policies, 
which are often designed with the explicit aim of encouraging 
changes to products (for example the UK’s levy on sugary 
drinks or design of front-of-pack labelling policies).99-101 
However, while many public health professionals support 
reformulation in principle, they raise concerns about the food 
industry has (re)interpreted reformulation to suit its business 
interests. Key criticisms of corporate reformulation include 
that firms are actually developing new products rather than 
reformulation the original product; that reformulating only 
a selection of products and not all products in the company’s 
portfolio is common; that there is uneven progress across 
country jurisdictions; that only incremental changes to 
products are the norm; and finally to questions regarding the 
ingredients used to substitute for the “harmful” nutrient, for 
example in the use of artificial sweeteners or fats.61,93,102
These concerns focus mainly on the limited public health 
benefits of voluntary, industry-led reformulation initiatives. 
We can also consider some of the broader political and market 
consequences of both reformulation and diversification. 
Product reformulation and portfolio diversification more 
generally have expanded the food industry’s market share and 
revenue, as well as their penetration of developing markets.103 
One study found that announcements of “healthy” new 
product launches improved the stock market performance 
of major food companies.104 The food industry’s response to 
health concerns about the products it sells has clear parallels 
with the food industry’s response to concerns about its 
environmental and labour practices. Like nutrition-oriented 
product reformulation, both organic and Fairtrade products 
have expanded corporate profits and market share.45,105-108 On 
the one hand, the win-win aspect of product reformulation 
highlights the success of the food industry in commercialising 
Table 3. Reformulation Pledges From IFBA Members
Company “Healthy” Brand Acquisition Reformulation Commitment
Kellogg’s
1999 acquire MorningStar Farms (veggie protein brand); 
launched Incogmeato burger in 2019 which will “bleed on 
the grill” 
Reduce sodium in cereals on average by more than 30% 
Ensure that 90% of cereals have 10 g or less of sugar per 30 g serving
Danone 2001 acquire Stonyfield (organic brand) 100% of its products to meet the Danone Nutritional Targets by 2020
Coca-Cola 2011 acquire Honest Tea (organic brand) Sugar reduced in more than 400 products
General Mills 2014 acquire Annie’s Inc. (organic brand) Sugar reduction target of 5% or more and strategy to limit calories
Mondelez 2015 acquire Enjoy Life Foods (natural foods company) Expand well-being brands in the portfolio, growing them at twice the rate of the base portfolio
PepsiCo 2018 acquire Health Warrior (plant-based nutrition company) By 2025 –At least 3/4 of the global foods portfolio volume will not exceed 1.1g of saturated fat per 100 calorie
Unilever 2017 acquire Tazo Tea and Sir Kensington’s (organic brands) By 2020 -Remove an additional 25% sugar in ready-to-drink teas
Mars 2019 acquire Foodspring (nutrition company) Reduce sodium in the global portfolio by 20% by 2021
Abbreviation: IFBA, International Food and Beverages Association.
Information sourced from:63,94-98
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and profiting from public health solutions to obesity. However, 
on the other, the ease with which these new sites of profit can 
be transformed into political influence underscores the risks 
that market solutions to public health issues present more 
generally.74 
We can also observe that, like the food industry’s development 
of organic and Fairtrade standards, the food industry uses 
reformulation to diffuse pressure for more radical changes 
to the production and consumption practices underpinning 
the current food system. Previous research has documented 
how Coca-Cola’s reformulation strategies in Australia 
have progressively aligned with public health expectations, 
shifting from “offering choices” to a more (albeit incomplete) 
systematic sugar reduction program across its portfolio.61 
These incremental improvements in food quality may diffuse 
the market and political pressure driving companies to 
reformulate.109 Moreover, product reformulation circumvents 
the need for more radical initiatives that impact the availability 
and affordability of processed foods and beverages. Some 
of the radical changes feared by the food industry have 
been intimated in the scholarly literature, where Clapp and 
Scrinis110 note food companies “rarely entertain the notion 
of removing certain products from their lines altogether.” 
Fuchs et al111 note that food industry initiatives avert the 
need for absolute reductions in production and consumption. 
Product reformulation represents a minor concession that 
accommodates some of the nutrition community’s concerns 
while enabling the continued consumption of branded foods 
and beverages. Interestingly, while brand acquisitions garner 
attention in the market analyses, they are often camouflaged 
from consumers. While a small number of corporations 
dominate key sectors of the food system (for example meat 
processing, packaged food and drink, retailing), this is not 
always reflected on product labels—a phenomenon referred 
to as “stealth ownership.”112 While the diversity of foods on 
supermarket shelves may suggest a similarly diverse food 
system, in fact the food system is characterised by intense 
concentration of corporate ownership.113,114
Discussion
Unlike corporate oppositional strategies, which are 
characterised by overt and aggressive contestation and threat-
response reactions to political and policy pressures, the food 
industry’s part of the solution strategy is characterised by 
appeasement (eg, via incremental concessions) and co-option 
(eg, attempts to partner with health organisations and health 
actors). Food corporations have particularly sought to engage 
with the policy and fora to which they previously sought to 
oppose, recognising that being present at the table where 
agendas are set, and being generally a more engaged and open 
actor, are themselves strategically powerful moves.74 A seat at 
the table is after all both a voice and influence, a chance to set 
agendas and an opportunity to construct the ‘solution.’115 This 
new strategic outlook has also involved concessions being 
made to public health, such as in areas like product content, 
labelling or advertising. In short, corporate non-market 
strategy has moved toward the general promotion of industry 
as a ‘good citizen’ willing to adapt for health goals.
While appeasement of public health concerns is important 
enough, the process of engagement and relationship building 
has involved food corporations trying to reconstruct 
themselves as health actors, often co-opting the language and 
discourses of health and blurring their agency in new and 
rather profane ways. For example, we have seen a raft of health 
promoting strategies launched by food corporations, involving 
the stretched combinations of concepts and terms such CSR, 
social environmental and health, the triple bottom line, and 
CSR initiative names such “Help Hunger Disappear,” “Healthy 
Living” and “Good Food, Good Life Community Program.”116 
Public health researchers have variously translated these 
as “health branding,”117 “public health CSR,”77 “CSR health-
related activities,”118 corporate “health and wellness programs,” 
and “corporate health promotion.”6 Herrick119 is surely right 
in labelling these moves, collapsed terms and self-labelling as 
the “strategic appropriation of health by CSR;” but it is more 
than this. It reflects how corporations have sought to colonise 
processes, discourses and institutional forms of behaviour in 
health by emulation and assimilation. This is a strategy of co-
option and hegemonic power consolidation which Gramscian 
scholars would readily identify.
While the offensive and defensive strategies of the past 
have perhaps tarnished the reputation of the food industry 
and fostered reciprocal opposition and antagonism from 
public health advocates, the food industry’s subsequent 
strategy to position itself as part of the solution to obesity 
and other diet-related diseases works to appease and pacify 
the public health community (although this is not always 
successful).84,120 But more widely, we must also remember that 
public health measures depend on political and sometimes 
public approval. Becoming legitimate and co-opting 
discourses, as well as diluting reputational damages of the 
past, is proving an exceptionally powerful tool of corporate 
reinvention and a profound recalibration of the perception 
of legitimacy of corporations with respect to public health 
actors.121 Consensual and socially legitimate power is far more 
powerful than that achieved through hostility and coercion, 
and far less burdensome in the medium to long term market 
strategies of corporations.
Indeed, scholars researching power differentiate between 
a coercive or compulsory exercise of power and a more 
persuasive exercise of power that is sometimes referred to as 
hidden, invisible or diffuse.111,122-124 The idea that power can 
have a coercive nature fits with descriptions of how power is 
exercised to resist or oppose unwanted political strategies—
for example the soft drink industry’s threats of job losses to 
oppose taxes on their products.125 In contrast, we can think 
of the strategies of appeasement, co-option and partnership 
as a more persuasive and pervasive form of power. It might 
also prove more durable due to its co-option of epistemic 
and regulatory communities concerned with public health. 
Again, lessons can (and likely are) learned from other 
sectors engaged with harmful commodities or products. For 
example, in the late 1990s, for example, in response to the 
threat of regulation of emissions, the automobile industry 
began to invest in low-emission technologies and promoted 
a “win-win” rhetoric of environmental sustainability and 
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corporate profits.126 This distinction between oppositional 
and appeasing manifestations of power helps to illuminate 
and explain some of the challenges and opportunities that the 
soft drink industry faces in using different political strategies. 
We can observe that oppositional manifestations of power are 
more likely to generate antagonism toward the industry, such 
as when the American and UK soft drink industries threated 
to withdraw investments or lay off employees if a sugary 
drink tax was passed (an exercise of oppositional structural 
power).13,127 In contrast, conciliatory manifestations of power 
are more likely to appease or “pacify” industry critics,84,128 such 
as when PepsiCo pledged to display calorie counts on front-
of-pack labels (an exercise of conciliatory structural power), 
or in cases when the food industry participates in public-
private partnerships (an exercise of conciliatory instrumental 
power).110,129 For example the soft drink industry’s partnership 
with the Clinton Foundation and American Heart Association 
in the United States helped to avoid pending litigation against 
the industry.30
The ability of corporate concessions to facilitate corporate 
governance of the food system reflects a core difference in how 
oppositional and conciliatory political strategies influence the 
political environment and generate a political economy of food 
in which corporate power and activities are normalised. Both 
the threat of job loss (an oppositional strategy) or the offer of 
concessions (an appeasement strategy) can delay the advent 
of unwanted policies, yet how they achieve this outcome is 
quite different. The threat of job losses essentially punishes 
regulatory action, whereas the offering of incremental 
concessions enables regulatory inaction by accommodating 
some of the public health demands in an industry initiative. 
More directly, in business terms, the food industry’s 
strategies of appeasement and co-option (its “part of the 
solution” strategy) have paid market and political dividends. 
In the case of product reformulation and diversification, they 
have expanded the market share and revenues of powerful 
companies.130 Incremental changes to products or business 
practices (such as reducing the sugar in some products or 
restricting marketing to children in certain jurisdictions) 
help to diffuse challenges to the status quo and to reduce 
pressures for transformative change.64,126,131,132 The industry’s 
development and promotion of self-regulation as well as 
their participation in policy-making also acquire and secure 
private rule-making power and enable industry governance 
of the food system.53,121 Corporate accommodations and 
concessions can also improve the industry’s relationship with 
influential stakeholders in government and public health, as 
we can see with the food industry in South Africa.69 Lastly, 
the potential for the industry’s “part of the solution” strategy 
to persuade public health advocates to collaborate with the 
industry or view them as potential partners can fragment 
the public health community. The absence of a strong public 
health alliance has important consequences for political 
influence, as interest group cohesion is a predictor of political 
influence.133-135 The lack of a coordinated public health voice 
gives the food industry the opportunity to dominate issue 
framing in the media.136 This suggests that in addition to 
bolstering the political resources of the food industry, the 
strategies of appeasement and co-option can also diminish the 
political resources of the industry’s opposition by fragmenting 
it or making it seem redundant or overbearing.
Despite this, there is a clear consensus that the industry’s 
offensive and defensive strategies conflict with public health 
interests and still continue to this day despite the changes 
discussed above. In Gramscian terms, hegemony is never 
complete and is always subject to new challenges.137 The 
absence of corporate transparency about these strategies and 
the lengths companies go to hide these political strategies 
from public view demonstrate the industry’s awareness 
that these strategies reflect poorly on their public image. 
In contrast, the industry’s appeasement, co-option and 
partnership strategies have fostered greater ambivalence 
from public health and government stakeholders. Some 
government and public health stakeholders support industry 
efforts to be “more responsible” and endorse the development 
of public-private partnerships.138-140 Others have expressed 
scepticism over whether corporate actions would match 
corporate rhetoric. Indeed, the absence of promised change, 
and continued marketing of harmful products have produced 
a push-back in terms of the leniency and legitimacy offered 
to food corporations. What were often benign perspectives 
on their Road to Damascus transitions have shifted in some 
high-profile cases. For example, while the WHO outlined a 
range of “recommended actions” for the private sector in its 
2004 Global Strategy on Diet, Physical Activity and Health and 
referred to the private sector as “partners” in its 2008-2013 
Action Plan for Noncommunicable Diseases, its 2016 report on 
Fiscal policies for diet and the prevention of noncommunicable 
diseases focused instead on strategies to counteract industry 
opposition to public health policies.136,141,142
Conclusion
Corporate strategies of appeasement, co-option and 
partnership can be characterised by the giving of concessions, 
the emphasis on corporate responsibility and good behaviour, 
and projecting the zeitgeist of corporations being more 
engaged, open and involved in partnerships designed to 
promote healthy diets or regulate the more harmful effects 
of certain food products. The co-option of food governance 
levers and institutions and the perception of food corporation 
legitimacy in the Gramscian sense are also understood to be 
powerful tools of socio-political and cultural power. Food 
corporations have surely understood these as important 
strategically, and such strategic shifts would have been 
planned, learned through observation, or otherwise filtered 
through the global culture of corporate experience. Part of 
this logic is the transition of industry under capitalism, which 
mutated from the robber baron dynamics of the late nineteenth 
and early Twentieth centuries, to the Fordist models of the 
mid-Twentieth century, through to modern benevolent 
practices and forms of public engagement witnessed by 
CSR, philanthrocapitalism, corporate foundations, self-
regulation and so on.92 All these new friendly faced variants 
of capitalism mask, perhaps, the growth of transnational 
oligopolies, financialization and deregulation, workforce 
precarity, austerity, all under public-private neoliberal global 
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governance and truly transnational regulatory capture.143
Ultimate, all this is about the relationship between market 
strategy – that concerned with preserving market position 
and profits – and non-market strategies – those being 
the political and regulatory environments that permit or 
inveigh on business. Food corporations have recognised that 
different non-market strategies were required in the face of an 
increasingly hostile regulatory environment, and shifted gear 
in their relationships with institutions, public health and the 
broader public. They have at the same time regeared product 
lines, continued to sell harmful products where they can, and 
made yet more profits. Politically and commercially it is a 
power play that appears to be succeeding unless it continues 
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